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30 January 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
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\*Cuba: [Cuban interest in supporting guerrilla campaigns in other Latin American countries is reflected in a questionnaire which some 150 Peruvians recently training in Cuba were asked to fill out.]

[The 58-point questionnaire covered a number of political, military, and geographic subjects, as well as matters on legal and illegal entry into the country and methods by which foreigners can buy property and establish commercial firms. There were also questions on drop zones suitable for air supply of guerrilla bands.]

[whether other nationals were being given the same questionnaire, but the list of questions does not appear specifically tailored to Peru.]

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Communist China - Laos: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Chinese Communists have become more active in northern Laos.

[REDACTED] the Chinese have been supplying arms to the Pathet Lao and that some Chinese military elements may be operating in Nam Tha Province.

[REDACTED] 3,000 Chinese workers will eventually be involved in Chinese Communist road construction in Nam Tha Province and that "some" have already arrived in accordance with a Sino-Lao agreement. General Phoumi proposed such a project to the Chinese during his visit to Peiping last December.

There is no confirmation that an agreement has been concluded; Vientiane officials have been vague on

this subject.  
(Map)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Canada: Prime Minister Diefenbaker is under increased fire for his 25 January statement in which he postponed until late May a decision on the controversial nuclear weapons issue.

Defense Minister Harkness told the US Embassy that Diefenbaker's policy statement represented a "compromise within the cabinet." However, Ambassador Butterworth believes Diefenbaker deliberately intended to confuse public debate over whether Canada should accept nuclear warheads for its present weapons systems. Butterworth fears that those Canadians who now support military cooperation with the US will be undermined and that negotiations with the US on the nuclear problem will be hampered.

Regarding continental defense arrangements under NORAD, Diefenbaker said negotiations with the US on deployment of warheads to Canada will continue. He refused comment on Harkness' statement to the press that this should be interpreted to mean a "satisfactory agreement" will be reached soon.

Diefenbaker indicated that a decision on a nuclear capability for Canadian NATO forces in Europe would have to await developments at the 21-23 May NATO ministerial meeting.

A 20 January public opinion poll showed a majority in favor of Canada's acquiring nuclear capabilities in support of both NORAD and NATO. Press

reaction to the government's continued vacillation has grown more critical since Diefenbaker's speech. The Liberal Party has endorsed acquisition and will make this a major issue in the election it apparently hopes to force on the minority government this spring. Diefenbaker can be expected to counter criticism of his policy by dwelling on the anti-US themes implicit in his 25 January statement.

\*India - USSR: Foreign Secretary Desai has informed Ambassador Galbraith that [ ] crated MIG-21 (Fishbed) fighters have arrived in Bombay.

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[ ] At Moscow's request, New Delhi promised not to publicize the shipment, but will give the facts when asked. Desai discounted the military importance of the delivery, but emphasized its value as a political ploy vis-à-vis the Chinese.

[ ] While not mentioning the arrival of MIGs, Delhi radio on 29 January devoted considerable attention to Soviet aid and Indo-Soviet cooperation. R. K. Nehru's visit to Moscow and possible visits to India by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin and Defense Minister Malinovsky were highlighted, and the Indians contrasted Moscow's "appreciation" and Peiping's "denunciation" of India's policy of nonalignment.

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NOTES

USSR: The USSR may attempt another lunar probe on or about 2 February, when lunar illumination conditions will be similar to those which prevailed when the Soviets attempted a lunar probe on 4 January 1963. The operation on 4 January probably was intended to soft-land an instrumented package of about 900 pounds on the surface of the moon. Information reported by such a package on the properties of the lunar surface would have great practical application to a manned lunar landing program. [REDACTED]

Jordan: The Jordanian Government has asked the Soviets whether a Soviet oil company now working in Pakistan could conduct oil exploration in Jordan, according to Prime Minister Tal. Since the US recognized the Yemeni republic over their strong objections, the Jordanians have sought to explore the possibilities of trade and diplomatic relations with the USSR, and have made a point of telling US officials so. The Jordanians clearly hope by this tactic to persuade the US to give more weight to their views, but they probably feel that they might also obtain some material benefits from relations with the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

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